

Workshop: Profs. G. Strawson & M. Montague on Philosophy of Mind

- 日時 : 2015 年 5 月 15 日 (金) 16:30~19:30
- 場所 : 京都大学文学部総合研究棟 2 号館第 6 演習室
- 使用言語 : 英語

Galen Strawson:

Title: The primacy of panpsychism

Abstract:

[1] Stoff ist Kraft (\approx being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (\approx being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (\approx being is qualitatively). [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (\approx being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and undiscarded consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. This is not simply because panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of conscious experience is certain, and that panpsychism doesn't posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. A question arises about why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is zero evidence: non-experiential concrete reality. The question is the more pressing because physics with its numbers and equations is perfectly silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.

Michelle Montague:

Title: Consciousness and cognitive phenomenology

Abstract:

I am going to argue that a successful account of what makes an occurrent thought a conscious thought must appeal to phenomenological features. If this is right, a further question arises: which kind of phenomenological features? I will argue that s

ensory phenomenology cannot do the job, and that we cannot give an adequate account of what conscious thought is without appealing to what is now called 'cognitive phenomenology'.